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1 Introduction
The idea that policies of structural adjustment have
to give way to a second wave of reforms oriented
towards upgrading the provision of public services,
especially for the poor and neglected portions of the
population, has become a consensus among
policymakers in the major international and
multilateral agencies.1 Decentralisation, pluralisation
of providers and user participation have been
consensually pinpointed as the most appropriate
measures to produce the desired effects. While
official documents from these agencies specify with
caution that no one single model will fit all and that
different combinations of these measures should be
utilised according to national specifications (World
Bank 2003: 10–18; Ahmad et al. 2005; Slack 2007),
little attention has been given to the contextual
politics of service delivery reforms.2
Efforts to systematically compare three different
national contexts – India, Mexico and Brazil – show an
extraordinary variation as to the degree, interests
involved and meaning of changes which, in theory,
correspond to these countries’ commitment to the
service delivery reforms agenda.3 Said variation is closely
linked to political–institutional contexts and the
histories of conflict, dealings and cooperation by which
these institutions – as well as the most relevant
organised social interests in a determined area of public
policy – have been constructed.4 However, consideration
of the contextual politics and, consequently, the
empiric variation in the world is relevant not for its
diversity alone but for the similarities that this diversity
reveals, pointing to underlying analytic dimensions
which deserve careful attention.
A few analytic dimensions are crucial in understanding
service delivery reforms in the contexts studied here:
the historical timing of local reforms and international
consensus, the baselines of different sectors targeted
by the reforms processes, and the degree and
institutional locus of local discretion in policy as they
relate to the federative arrangement as well as to the
design of the policies to be implemented. The relation
between national and sub-national regimes, and the
role of field experts in the construction of the agendas
of winning reforms as well as those of the opposition
have also been demonstrated to be crucial, as they
show contrasting patterns in the politics of reform at
national, state and municipal or local levels. However,
due to space limitations for this article, only the first
dimensions will be examined. As such, we will focus
on cases of reform in the healthcare sector and, to a
lesser extent, the main policies in the social service
sector – namely, the direct cash transfer programme in
Mexico (Oportunidades) and the Public Distribution
System in India (PDS).5 This article will examine the
consequences of these cases in terms of their analytic
implications in understanding the reforms.6
In India, Brazil and Mexico, the healthcare and social
services sectors have been undergoing reform
processes since the early 1990s, according to moderate
estimations. Only in the latter case did the timing of
the reforms coincide with a general perception that
the healthcare sector was going through a financing
crisis and, as a consequence, the federal administration
adopted the most orthodox agenda. However, given
the state of consolidation and development of
sectorial baselines, the orthodox agenda clashed with
corporate groups within the sector, and thus the
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reform became irregular and came to a halt. In Brazil,
the discrepancy was the highest, and a lack of
international consensus combined with an urgency for
measures to resolve financial crisis favoured processes
of institutional innovation. However paradoxical it may
seem, these processes combined circumstantial
affinities between the military government – with its
tendency to administrative rationalisation and capacity
to impose losses – and the Sanitarista movement,
engaged in the democratisation and universalisation of
healthcare. In India, the crisis took place only a few
years before the start of the reforms. This fact
reinforced the traditional emphasis that the healthcare
system tended to place on family planning, largely
supported by international financial sources. While
social actors tend to concentrate themselves on
programmes in this strategic policy field, the reforms
of the 1990s aimed to address the fragmentation and
underdevelopment of the system. It did so in two
different ways: by setting up economic regulations and
by encouraging a concentration of private providers
(capital), so as to enhance the complexity of the
services offered by the market.
The federative arrangements in the three countries
differ considerably, conferring greater attributions
and capacities for bargaining and decision making
upon the different levels of government. On the
other hand, in national reform policies, the degrees
and institutional loci of discretion at the local level
vary in relation to each sector and its most relevant
actors, but also depending on how they are
embedded in federative arrangements. In India,
despite the slow growth of local government bodies,
its attributions are still limited and its weight
inexpressive in the dispute for agenda and
implementation of reform policies, while states enjoy
notable autonomy, limiting the union’s capacity to
the use of fairly inductive strategies. In Brazil,
recognition of municipalities as autonomous
members of the federative pact has changed the
federal government’s capacities to negotiate the
implementation of policy. This has paradoxically led
national political leaders to adopt centralised
strategies of direct budgetary transfers to
municipalities in order to cultivate their adhesion to
federal policy preferences. Mexico occupies an
intermediate position. On the one hand,
municipalities enjoy a constitutionally autonomous
status and attributions but they are subordinate to
the states; on the other hand, bargaining for the
definition and implementation of reforms occurs
between the federal and state governments. Still,
given the strong centralism in the Mexican federative
arrangement, traditionally, the states have diverged
from the centre less than in India.
In this way, the direct cash transfer programme,
Oportunidades, in Mexico, was purposely designed
from the centre to avoid any intermediation between
beneficiaries and the state, but the attempt, revealing
as it is, showed itself to be unviable and allowed for
the political use of the programme by intermediaries
both old and new. The implementation of healthcare
reform in Brazil and, more specifically, the
construction of a national and universal basic
healthcare system, resorted to a strategy (Programa
de Saúde da Família or Family Health Program, PSF)
defined in a highly centralised way, decentralised to
the local level for its execution. In India, states with
universal food distribution programmes opposed the
targeting of PDS, and the local government bodies
do not seem to have taken on a relevant role in
visibility or assisting the complaints of the population
victimised by the grain distributors.
2 Two crucial dimensions of analysis
There are two dimensions of analysis which have
enormous relevance in understanding the reach and
effectiveness of service delivery reforms which have
not received systematic attention: (1) the historical
timing of reforms and sectorial baselines, and (2) the
degree and institutional locus of local discretion in
policy. These dimensions clearly reference contextual
politics and comprehend certain conditional factors of
the reforms, which prompt a surprising variation of
combinations in which decentralisation, pluralisation
and participation are allied in the process of service
provision reforms, producing diverse results. This
variation indicates vulnerable points in the
presumptions of the reforms in question (see Joshi,
this IDS Bulletin), as well as serious gaps in the
understanding of the reform process itself.
2.1 Historical timing of reforms and sectorial
baselines
The idea of a second wave of reforms is indeed
suggestive, since the ocean metaphor refers to the
exhausted effects of a first set of reforms, as well as
the vigorous advance of a new consensus spreading
out to various latitudes. Yet, with an attentive eye on
both the historical timing of the reforms and the
sectorial baselines that condition them, one can see
an extraordinary variation in both the possible
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choices and the real adopted proposals. This variation
indicates a low adherence of the standard
international accounts of service delivery reforms to
the real world. In national literatures, one may also
find a curious phenomenon, an embodiment of
these undifferentiated narratives that cast the
reforms of recent years in a negative light, classifying
their true intentions (‘neoliberal’). Still, the changes in
each context obey complex processes with dynamics
of their own which, although affected considerably
by emerging international consensuses, preceded the
second wave of reforms.
Vast reform processes usually bring together vast
consensuses about the diagnosis and the solutions
and some kind of trigger or alarm arising from the
performance of the sector in question. That is, the
problem to be taken into account is often implied
under ‘crisis’. It is possible, however, that both
components do not coincide, whether in the form
of general consensus without crises or vice versa.
This analytical distinction becomes relevant when
considering that the presence of strong international
consensuses in respect of how a determined sector,
for example healthcare, should be reformed,
constricts the space for innovation and possible
options for intra-national actors. Inversely, the need
to confront sectorial crises which, by definition,
momentously puts the status quo in check, without
the configuration of solid consensuses, leaves room
for a bargaining process between the relevant
sectorial actors. Where there are no sectorial actors
with the capacity to introduce reforms to alter the
status quo, the status quo tends to fall back into place
easily. This will be seen shortly, while in India and
Brazil, the financial crises in the healthcare systems
occurred before the emergence and/or consolidation
of the first and second waves of state reforms. In
Mexico’s case, the consensuses preceded the crisis.
On the other hand, the significance of the crisis and
the measures are apt to be decanted into a viable
consensus depend considerably on sectorial baselines.
India’s healthcare sector has been historically
fragmented and marked by peculiarly low levels of
universalisation. The formal workforce is at a level
close to 10 per cent, drastically delimiting maximum
coverage under the social security system (Nundy
2007). Even the organisation of healthcare services for
this portion of the workforce presents fragmentations
from functional corporations within the public service
– railroad workers, the army, and various segments of
the public service sector possess their own healthcare
systems. The uninsured population is attended to by a
series of medical institutions that go from hospitals
and public healthcare facilities to polyclinics and public
dispensaries; part of which ascribe to other systems of
medicines – most notably Ayurveda, Yoga, Unani,
Siddha and homeopathy. Still, healthcare expenses are
mostly private or paid by families, in that throughout
the country, 73.5 per cent of total healthcare spending
is paid for from the population’s pockets. In the case
of New Delhi, the population pays for 56.41 per cent
out of their own pockets (Jalal and Nundy 2006).
The financial crisis that the healthcare sector faced in
the 1980s reinforced one characteristic that has been
distinctive since the late 1960s – namely, a strong
emphasis on family planning. Propelled by
international donors and entities (both national and
international) dedicated to reproductive health, the
healthcare agenda came to move subtly from birth-
rate reduction to reproductive rights and options,
and from family planning to family welfare and, more
recently, health and family welfare, but preserving
the same emphasis (Narayanan 2006). In this way,
the response to the crisis in the 1980s was driven by
the donors’ agenda towards family welfare. Further,
given the disproportionate amount of resources
available for family welfare, which in a certain
dimension end up financing the entire public medical
system, a part of the social actors and most relevant
disputes in the area have been directed precisely
towards the field of reproductive health. The
consensus of the 1990s, centred on the structural
adjustment of the state,7 arrived after the financial
crisis and confronted a healthcare sector whose
fragmentation confers upon the idea of privatisation
a primordial meaning of concentration of capital,
economic regulation and market construction, rather
than one of privatisation as a retraction of the state.
In a similar sense, later precepts like the pluralisation
of providers lose meaning if placed in this context or
characterised by these sectorial baselines. In fact, the
policies of reform have resorted to public financial
support, fiscal incentives, subsidies and other stimuli
for the creation of the market, in particular the offer
for much more complex services – hospitals.
It is not possible to formulate a general
characterisation of the Brazilian healthcare system
that outlines a pertinent description of the past
50 years, due to the intense process of institutional
reform that occurred from the 1970s on, passing from
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the healthcare model consecrated in the 1988
constitution – the Single Healthcare System (Sistema
Único de Saúde, SUS) and through successive steps
and disputes which led to SUS regulation,
implementation and operative institutional
specification. In the 1960s, at the time of the coup
which installed a military dictatorship (1964–84), the
public healthcare system still presented three distinct
features: (1) institutional fragmentation for the
population covered by collective healthcare services,
as the Institutes of Retirement and Pensions were
created within the corporate logic of the 1930s,
providing different independent services to different
professional categories; (2) dependence on the private
sector contracted to attend the insured population,
i.e. those subscribing to the social security system; and
(3) the massive presence of philanthropic institutions
in attendance of the open public or noninsured
population (Dowbor 2007). Despite criticisms and
common complaints in the literature that analysed
transformations in healthcare over this period,
processes of unification, amplification and
bureaucratic–administrative rationalisation of the
system were urged during the dictatorship. In this
way, by the start of the 1970s social security
comprised 80 per cent of the economically active
population (Dowbor, this IDS Bulletin). In later years,
thanks to the ‘Healthcare Chapter’ approved by the
Constitutional Assembly, and a strategy of
extraordinarily centralised implementation, healthcare
reform was actualised, that included the neglected
poor population, in national unification and the
universalisation of a basic healthcare system.
How is it possible that the configuration of the
healthcare system has changed in such an
accentuated manner, imposing losses upon corporate
and economic actors? Everything seems to point to a
favourable confluence of factors. First, the sectorial
baselines at the start of 1960s defined two relevant
actors – the private medical–hospital sector, which
held together the infrastructure and contained a
considerable capacity for attendance, and the
corporations, which were dedicated to serving a
relatively limited set of professional categories. The
dictatorship imposed the overthrow of the latter set
of actors and initially favoured the former by means
of a unification model which relied on the public
healthcare sector’s hiring of private services. Second,
the financial crisis in the healthcare sector erupted in
1979, placing suspicion on the principal beneficiary of
the status quo – the medical private sector. It is
important to remember that, at this time, neo-
conservative experiments in the UK and the USA
were taking their first steps and there was not yet an
international consensus with respect to structural
state reforms and even less in regard to precepts for
orienting sectorial reforms. On the other hand,
generations of doctors trained in social medicine –
the Sanitarista movement – and often affiliated with
clandestine organisations and leftist parties came to
occupy positions in the public service sector that had
been opened through the process of bureaucratic–
administrative rationalisation. The Sanitarista
movement ended up as an emerging protagonist
endowed with a growing bargaining capacity and
armed with its own agenda of reforms. Due to an
auspicious environment for institutional innovation –
crisis without consensus – the movement was able
to ally with a military government which, besides
having a high capacity for imposing losses, was
looking to innovate and had an emerging need for
an anti-status quo actor with competent knowledge.
In fact, and as Dowbor has shown (this IDS Bulletin),
the trajectory of the relationship between the
military government and the Sanitarista movement is
not just made up of conflict – it also includes a good
measure of circumstantial affinities. The
Constitutional Assembly provided an extraordinary
opportunity to subordinate the intense bargaining
process between the Sanitarista movement agenda
and the large representatives of private medicine,
producing an accommodation of interests which
cleared the way for profound reform in building up a
public system of basic healthcare, while preserving
the role of the private sector for segments of the
solvent population – in other words, those who can
afford to pay for healthcare service, at times via the
insurance market, at times via outpatient health
services.
Differently from Brazil (where the formation of
international consensus about state reform was
extemporaneous and disconnected from the
implemented healthcare reform) and, to a lesser
extent, India, in Mexico the idea of crisis came in the
1980s as a diagnosis coupled with a package of
structural adjustment; in other words, the consensus
brought with it both ‘sickness’ and ‘remedy’,
foretelling sectorial malfunctions which lacked
previous social awareness. However, the adoption of
the measures recommended by the diagnosis faced
serious obstacles. The sectorial baselines present by
far the most elevated degree of institutional
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development and consolidation of the three
countries under analysis. Curiously, said development
and consolidation are related, in a parallel way, to
the power and capacity for resistance of actors
interested in defending the institutional structures
that should be transformed. As in the other two
contexts, the healthcare system in Mexico
corresponds to the basic division between the
insured population, or those covered by social
security, and the open, uninsured population, though
the proportions and range of corporations associated
with these proportions are clearly distinct. The
Mexican Institute for Social Security (Instituto
Mexicano de Seguridad Social, IMSS) and the Social
Security Institute for Civil Servants (Instituto de
Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del
Estado, ISSSTE) are the institutions that provide
universal coverage for formal sector workers,
servicing 50 per cent of the population. The other
half of the population, including informal sector
workers, are serviced by public healthcare under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health (Secretaría de
Salud y Asistencia, SSA) (Blanco-Mancilla 2006). The
private insurance market, the public corporations of
medical attention by professional category and
traditional medicine are, frankly, marginal.
IMSS and ISSSTE are prototypical institutions of the
so-called ‘social compromise’ of the Mexican post-
revolutionary state and, at the same time,
corporations of notable political force inside the
traditional power structure. Though weakened with
the passing of time, both corporations succeeded in
barring healthcare reform in aspects that would
impose losses – notably those measures inclined
toward the unification of the system, the
privatisation of pensions systems and an increase in
the Ministry of Health’s power in the healthcare
sector. The reform took place where it was possible
to overcome resistance, i.e. in the realm of public
healthcare services, marked by a clear subordination
to the federal executive and where there were no
organised corporate interests of considerable
magnitude (Blanco-Mancilla 2006). Reform for the
uninsured population proceeded through the
decentralisation of coordination and financial
responsibilities of the federal level to the state level,
as well as a stimulation of diversification in financial
sources. Even so, the reform was extremely partial
and reached less than half of the Mexican states due
to the confluence of contrary interests on the part
of large healthcare corporations, the Labour
movement in alliance with them and various
governors who were reluctant to assume previously
federal functions that would have to be paid with
state resources. In the mid-1990s, after the thorough
restructuring of the post-revolutionary Mexican state
and the decay of its sustaining bases – among them
corporatism – the executive power made another
attempt at reforms with more success, which
included the privatisation of the pension system and
full transference of ownership and administration of
the Ministry of Health’s organs to the states.
2.2 Degree and institutional locus of local
discretion in policy
Public sector reform processes imply both different
degrees of discretion in local supervision and policy
management and placing such discretion at different
loci of the institutional structure responsible for
operating policy. Who, and under what circumstances is
it possible to decide what, at what levels of government
and in which organs of these levels? This question has
been revealed as crucial to understanding, in the
reforms under analysis, not only the reach and actual
consequences of participation and decentralisation
reforms but also the strategic choices of social
actors, including bureaucracies and local politicians. It
is possible to territorially reduce the concentration of
functions or responsibilities without altering the
hierarchy or degree of centralisation in decision-
making processes. It is also possible to increase
capacities for spending and collection in sub-national
and sub-administrative units but there is no direct
proportion between an increase in spending power
and autonomy in the allocation of new resources
(Arretche 2006). Last but not least, it is possible to
transfer decisive autonomy. There is no necessary or
single relation between these three processes and
they can be set in motion separately, individually or
as a whole, gaining approval from the institutions of
political representation which regulate the
relationship between federative units and the union
– as in the case of federalist countries considered in
this article – or arising from within the bureaucratic
structure of a determined sector or programme.
From a more general point of view, the distinctive
features of the federative arrangements emerge as
undeniable determinant factors in the meanings
adopted by the decentralising and participatory
reforms in each context. The Brazilian Constitution of
1988 defined states and municipalities as members of
a federative pact, meaning that the latter are
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constitutionally autonomous entities and not
obligated to accept state decisions regarding policies
affecting the municipality’s population (Anastásia
2004). In Indian federalism, states enjoy a strong
autonomy in relation to the federation
(Bhattacharyya 2005). Though the constitutional
amendments of 1992 had multiplied the number of
local urban and rural bodies of government, their
capacity to provide services and collect taxes is
extremely limited (Rao 2002). The Mexican case
differs from the two previous ones. Municipalities in
Mexico are not only strongly subordinated to the
state governments but, to a large extent, they are
political–administrative jurisdictions which overrun or
do not correspond to the ‘natural’ limits of specific
urban settlements – as illustrated by the discrepancy
in the number of inhabitants per municipality in
Brazil (33,000) and in Mexico (42,000).8 In fact,
Mexican federalism is well known for an accentuated
concentration of power at the union level (Aguilar
Villanueva 1996).
Roughly put, municipality, state and federation
appear in the three contexts having politically
different capacities, indicating that the municipal
level of government in Brazil, the state level in India,
and the federal level in Mexico, occupy privileged
bargaining positions in the definition of policy.
However, the sector reforms of public service
delivery are of national character, meaning that they
are implemented from general agreements made
among the elites that govern at the federal level,
which, from the perspective of the centre, present
the challenge of coordinating sub-national units. In
other words, given an agenda of reforms or a set of
national policies, the federation should find the
mechanisms capable of obtaining or forcing
cooperation from states and municipalities. As shown
below, the federal arrangements hold decisive
weight in the way in which reforms are designed
and, more specifically, in the institutional degree and
locus of local discretion in the formulation and
implementation of policy. Resorting to a certain
simplification of the argument, it is possible to affirm
that in Mexico negotiation occasionally occurs
between federation and states but, whenever
possible, the former simply imposes itself, eliminating
the costs associated with the latter’s agreement and
intervention. In Brazil, bargaining occurs directly
between the federal level and municipalities, eluding
the bureaucratic and political structures of mediation
and bargaining at the state level. In India, state
autonomy is so robust that, on the one hand, states
possess their own set of reforms and, on the other,
federal reforms are limited and markedly inductive.
However, as for the designing of direct cash transfer
and basic healthcare reforms, the degree of
municipal discretion, just as the institutional niche in
which it lies, concentrates the decision-making
capacity in determined actors and organs, conferring
upon them political protagonism and making them
the object of strategic action by other social actors.
This has relevant consequences: when the
participatory component of the reforms – via
councils, commissions, assemblies, etc. – does not
coincide with the institutional locus of discretion, it
is plausible that the effects of public oversight
attributed to participation will tend to be lesser.
It is possible, though in an extremely synthetic mode,
to show how the degree and institutional locus of
discretion vary depending on how they are articulated
to the profile of federative arrangements and to policy
structure. In Brazil, sectorial reform policies in the
post-transition context, notably the implementation of
SUS, have heavily relied on conditional budgetary
transferences as a mechanism to induce the
municipalities to adopt federal policy preferences. The
Family Health Programme (Programmea Saúde da
Família, PSF) was the federal strategy defined for the
national implementation of SUS and, as in other cases,
its adhesion is not only voluntary and applies to
municipalities (overrunning the state level) alone, but it
supposes subscription to a contract with the union by
which municipalities integrally adopt the programme’s
framework and rules receiving federal transfers to the
support of the programme (Dowbor 2007). In spite of
considerable advances in fiscal decentralisation at the
municipal level, local discretion is limited to – as in the
fundamental characteristics of PSF – accepting or
refusing the model defined by the central government.
However, as PSF is a programme operated by the
Municipal Ministry of Health’s bureaucratic-
administrative and professional structure of basic
healthcare, other aspects of the programme, which
are not a part of its framework or basic rules, become
the object of local disputes: whether actors of the
third sector could or could not be hired to
administrate the programme in the city of São Paulo,
whether it is necessary or not to introduce
mechanisms of public oversight or, in a micro-level, in
which areas of the city to invest more in the hiring of
PSF teams.
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Still, it is possible to operate programmes in an
entirely centralised manner, reducing local discretion
of policy management to the minimum. Despite its
ample coverage and social capillarity, the evolution of
the programmes of direct cash transfers in Mexico is
emblematic in this respect. Due to strong criticism of
the political use of the Solidarity programme under
the administration of president Salinas de Gortari, an
elimination of all intermediation between state and
beneficiaries was incorporated as a fundamental
feature of the Oportunidades programme’s structure.
Each of the stages in the programme’s
implementation process, including rolling registration
for beneficiaries, was defined and made operational
at the federal level with intervention, when
necessary, from outsourced services from large
private firms rather than states or municipalities
(Hevia 2007). Under such an institutional design, in
which interest intermediation must be eliminated,
there is only room for direct participation without
representation and without mechanisms for
aggregating opinions or preferences, which could
foster collective or political agency. In a coherent
way, participation in the Oportunidades programme
remains restricted to a system of complaint-filing. As
demonstrated by Hevia (this IDS Bulletin), in spite of
the local capillarity of the Mexican State, formerly
omnipresent, or perhaps due to the kind of partisan
and corporate State capillarity, the intention of
connecting the citizenry directly to the programme
without intermediaries has been proven unviable and
the attempt to ‘protect’ the citizenry from the
voracity of corporate structures ineffective. Unallied
and harmless users have had to confront old and
new forms of political patronage. It is worth
mentioning that in the design of the Bolsa Família
programme, local discretion has been limited
considerably, though not eliminated, being that the
beneficiaries in each municipality are registered by
their respective town halls. In fact, São Paulo’s
government programme, Minimum Income (Renda
Mínima), shares with Oportunidades the aim of
suppressing costs related to collective actors’
intermediation (Houtzager, this IDS Bulletin). The
modalities of collective action favoured by this kind
of design, as seen in São Paulo, are opportunistic and
have an eye on the inclusion of those linked to some
associations in the register of beneficiaries.
While in India states and the union are co-responsible
for the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS),
the former set the pace and the best strategy for
confronting or adopting the strategy of targeting and
reduction of subsidies urged by the federal
government. In harmony with the differences
between federative arrangements previously
mentioned, this degree of autonomy for decision
making at the state level can be currently seen in the
protective and promotional social security
programmes as a whole (Mehtta 2007). In fact, in the
case of food security, the states that set up universal
systems opposed themselves to the measures of the
centre and, under federal level constraints, chose
alternative paths. In Delhi, for instance, once the
administrative criteria, which allow the division of the
population into types of beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries, is defined according to poverty lines, the
operation of the programme tends to make room for
discretion. In this case, the shift to focalisation
respected the usual local channels of distribution used
by the PDS, namely, the fair price shops. These shops
are largely controlled by small individual proprietors
and authorised to sell grains and other goods inscribed
in the PDS. Unintentionally, this design concentrated
local discretion into the hands of small, individual
store-owners who in turn used it to undermine the
programme’s objectives, diverting grains to a parallel
market, forcing beneficiaries to buy the grains at
higher prices and establishing an exploitative
relationship with them (Pande 2007). Such an extreme
pluralisation of providers generated collective reactions
which allowed for the correction of some distortions
and the introduction of a certain amount of local
oversight over the providers themselves but,
paradoxically, the motives which led to the rise in
accountability have little or nothing to do with the
precepts of service delivery reforms. The Right to
Information Act, sanctioned by the legislature in 2001,
permitted middle-class civil organisations to establish
ties with demands of local largely neglected
populations, redefining such demands as a part of a
larger battle for State accountability and transparency
(Pande, this IDS Bulletin).
3 Conclusions
Contextual politics caused considerable changes in the
way that the most common recommendations from
the second wave reforms have been implemented.
National experiences have combined the
decentralisation of provisioning and policymaking,
pluralisation of service providers and users’ participation
in ways that challenge the usual classifications,
requiring a more accurate analysis. This article has
focused on two crucial analytic dimensions: the
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historical timing of reforms and sectorial baselines,
and the degree and institutional locus of local
discretion in policy. Both are helpful in shedding light
on the paths that the reform processes have taken in
each country, though the same recommendations are
common to all three cases.
Both analytic dimensions have different practical or
normative consequences for policy design. While the
former is posed as a starting point for the reform
process – and in this sense is merely a piece of data –
the degree of local discretion in policy is a political
decision that is not only preterite but also related to
the future and, consequently, admits for changes at
least in its non-constitutional features, i.e. those
related to policy design rather than the federative
arrangement. As shown by the programmes Bolsa
Família, Oportunidades and PSF, the drastic
reduction of local discretionary power is quite
agreeable to the federal policy designers. However,
this reduction unintentionally favours opportunistic
actions on the part of local societal actors, and thus
presents obstacles to the construction of stable
public oversight in the long run. This matter is
relevant when considering that measures of
participation, decentralisation and pluralisation of
providers are supposedly aimed at the promotion of
social accountability in public services. Nonetheless, if
the role of local government is limited to registering
beneficiaries, as in the programmes of income
transfer, the societal actors are likely to pressure the
local bureaucracy and politicians for the inclusion of
their members or publics as beneficiaries. It is an
inexpensive way to ensure access to public benefits,
but does not promote relationships that favour the
improvement of accountability.
IDS Bulletin Volume 38  Number 6  January 2008 25
Notes
1 Besides the World Bank’s well-known World
Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for
Poor People, see the International Monetary Fund’s
(IMF) September 2003 Finance and Development
Report 40.3, in particular articles by Jeremy Clift,
John Williamson, Guillermo Ortiz, Shantayanan
Devarajan and Ritva Reinikka.
2 An interesting approach to contextual politics is
Harris et al. (2004).
3 The results are registered in the research project
‘Modes of Service Delivery, Collective Action, and
Societal Regulation’, conducted by IDS–DRC for the
Future State in partnership with CEBRAP. For more
on the project and other pertinent information,
see www.ids.ac.uk/futurestate/research/Phase2/
prog2/projects/modesofservdel.html.
4 See the polity approach (Houtzager 2003) and
politics of institutionalisation (Gurza Lavalle 1998:
182–214).
5 Bolsa Família in Brazil is one of the best known
examples of a direct cash transfer programme.
Due to a limit in space and that, methodologically,
the relation between the analytic dimension
proposed and the reform policies analysed is of a
descriptive nature, Bolsa Família and the Renda
Mínima programme in São Paulo will be
introduced solely as a counterpoint to the
Oportunidades programme.
6 There is a copious amount of literature (both
national and international) on the various subjects
discussed in this article. Except when absolutely
necessary, the references in this article allude to
research results that have been established in
various papers and research reports.
7 This article draws heavily on the project’s findings,
background papers and research reports (see
note 3).
8 According to Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e
Estatistica (IBGE) projections, Brazil had
186,000,000 inhabitants in 2006. In 2007, it totals
5,564 municipalities, with an average of 33,429.19
inhabitants/municipality. The equivalent statistics
for Mexico in 2007, according to Instituto Nacional
de Estadistica Geografia e Informática (National
Institute of Statistics, Georgraphy and Informatics,
INEGI), are: 103,263,388 inhabitants; 2,445
municipalities (42,234.51 inhabitants/municipality).
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